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This paper analyses the link between finance and growth by studying the effect that the 
process of financial deregulation and harmonisation of banking laws at the EU level has 
brought about on growth over the last 40 years. Our main findings point to the existence 
of a positive long-run growth impact from the liberalisation of capital controls and the 
harmonisation of banking legislation. Both policy changes affect growth even after 
controlling for other pro-growth policies implemented around the same time and they 
are robust to business cycle effects that could spuriously drive the relation. The analysis 
of the main channels through which our policy changes may have affected growth 
indicates that the harmonisation process has impacted growth through the increase in 
the level and efficiency of financial intermediation and the liberalisation of capital 
controls has mainly affected growth through improvements in the degree of efficiency 
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Non-technical Summary 
 
Over the last couple of decades most of the regulations and constraints imposed 
on banks by national authorities have been gradually dismantled. In the context of the 
Single Market, it was felt necessary to remove most of the legal barriers imposed to 
banks with the aim of generating more competitive pressure and in turn a better 
allocation of resources.  
The liberalisation of the financial services industry has taken place gradually 
through two important moves. On the one hand, Member States have made a pre-
emptive movement to deregulate national banking sectors in the advent of the creation 
of a single market, lifting any restrictions on quantities and prices. On the other, there 
has been a process of approaching the different EU banking legislations so as to 
harmonise regulations governing the banking industry across Europe, providing a level 
playing field for all credit institutions operating in different Member States and ensuring 
that competition is not distorted. 
This study aims at analysing the link between finance and growth by studying 
the effect that these institutional changes may have exerted on economic growth over 
the last 40 years. The experience of the EU may constitute an ideal scenario to analyse 
the finance-growth nexus and an opportunity to try to shed some light on the unresolved 
issue of causality between finance and growth. To the extent that Member States have 
adopted the regulatory changes imposed by the EU Authorities through the introduction 
of Directives that have the character of binding laws at the national level, we can argue 
that any significant statistical link between these policy changes and growth may not 
merely reflect a contemporaneous correlation, but a causal link.  
To measure the process of banking deregulation and harmonisation in the EU, 
we assemble a data set consisting of the implementation dates of the main EU 
Directives affecting the financial services industry. We also construct an index of 
deregulation which covers the liberalisation of capital controls and full deregulation of 
interest rates. We find evidence that the process of capital controls lifting and the 
harmonisation of banking laws at the EU level have brought about important benefits in 
terms of increases in the growth rate of the economy. The growth impact from the 
liberalisation of capital controls is found to be at least of 0.6% per year which is 
equivalent to 0.21% of the unconditional averaged growth rate of per capita output 
experienced in the EU over 1960-2001. The estimates of the growth effect from the 
harmonisation of banking regulations entail that the implementation of Directives 
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increase in output growth by at least 1% per year. These results appear robust to the 
inclusion of other pro-growth policy changes implemented around the same time and 
are not driven by business cycle effects.  
We further investigate the mechanisms through which these policy changes may 
have influenced the growth performance of EU economies. We consider two main 
channels: 1) the increase in the level of financial intermediation measured by the rise in 
the ratio of private credit to GDP and 2) the improvement in the quality and efficiency 
of the financial intermediation process proxied by the fall in the growth rate of the ratio 
of nonperforming loans to total loans. On this regard, we find that while the 
harmonisation process has impacted growth through the increase in the level and 
efficiency of financial intermediation, the liberalisation of capital controls has primarily 
affected growth through improvements in the degree of efficiency in financial 
intermediation. Furthermore, interest rate deregulation is found to affect the level of 
banking activity while not its efficiency. 
Overall, the positive benefits in terms of economic performance resulting from 
the liberalisation of capital controls and the harmonisation of banking regulations 
accord well with the expectations by the EU Authorities and Member States. The 
creation of a Single European Banking Market has opened domestic banking sectors, 
created more cross-border activity and in turn more competition, which have been all 
translated into greater banking activity and efficiency in the allocation of resources to 
productive use by decreasing the cost of capital. All these benefits have derived from 
the efforts made by the European and National Authorities who envisaged the need to 
couple the liberalisation of interest rates, capital controls and entry restrictions with the 
strengthening of prudential, supervisory and accounting standards. This has ensured that 
excessive competition does not destabilise the financial services industry. 
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1 Introduction 
  In this paper we analyse the link between finance and growth by studying the 
effect that the process of financial deregulation and harmonisation of banking laws at 
the EU level has had on growth over the last 40 years. Since February 1986 when the 
Single European Act was implemented, the banking industry in the EU has been subject 
to a gradual process of deregulation and harmonisation in order to achieve a Single 
European Banking Market. The main objective of this process has been to open 
domestic banking sectors and create more cross-border activity as well as greater 
competition, with the aim of achieving a more efficient banking sector across the EU. 
Simultaneous to this deregulation process, there has been an expansion of the banking 
sector across the EU as a result of the increase in price competition as well as in the 
scope of activities credit institutions can engage in. 
The finance-growth nexus has received a great deal of attention both theoretical 
and empirically. Early authors such as Joseph Schumpeter (1911), Gerschenkron 
(1962), Patrick (1966) and Hicks (1969) emphasised the important role accomplished 
by banks in the process of industrialisation and innovation by mobilising large amounts 
of funds to long-term investment projects. However, there has not been any consensus 
on the importance of the financial sector in affecting economic performance or on the 
transmission channels through which financial development may increase economic 
growth. Lucas (1988) asserted that economists “badly over-stress” the role of the 
financial sector and Joan Robinson (1952) stated that financial systems passively follow 
economic growth. Goldsmith (1969) argues that financial deepening brings about higher 
productivity and efficiency in the use of capital while McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973) find the increase in savings rates leading to a higher volume of investment as the 
main channel from finance to growth. De Gregorio and Guidoti (1995) find that around 
75% of the finance-growth nexus takes place through the increase in the efficiency of 
investment, which appears corroborated by Díaz-Alejandro (1985).  
Recently, a number of theoretical papers on finance and growth have emerged 
following the insights of the early endogenous growth models by Romer (1990), 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Lucas (1988)
1. Pagano (1993) highlights the three 
main channels through which finance may affect growth: 1) the increase in the rate of 
private savings, 2) the increase in the efficiency of the financial intermediation process 
                                                 
1 See Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Saint-Paul (1992) for 
endogenous growth models that analyse the joint emergence and development of financial systems and 
the process of sustained growth. 
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advocates that financial markets can affect growth in the long-run by accomplishing the 
following functions: provision of liquidity and agile mobilisation of funds from savers 
to investors, monitoring and screening of firms and managers, facilitating risk 
management and exchange, and exerting corporate control in order to align the interest 
of shareholders and managers. 
The experience of the EU may constitute an ideal scenario to analyse the 
finance-growth nexus and an opportunity to try to shed some light on the unresolved 
issue of causality between finance and growth. Arguably, if banking deregulation and 
harmonisation policy measures affect growth even after controlling for the level of 
development of the banking sector and to the extent that these policy changes have been 
exogenously imposed by the EU Authorities at the national level, we can argue that 
there may exist a causal link between financial markets and growth. To measure the 
process of banking deregulation and harmonisation in the EU, we assemble a data set 
consisting of the implementation dates of the main EU Directives affecting the financial 
services industry. We also construct an index of deregulation which covers the 
liberalisation of capital controls and full deregulation of interest rates.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the main 
avenues that have been taken with the aim of shedding some light on the direction of 
causality between finance and growth. Section 3 describes in detail the institutional 
background behind the EU banking deregulation and harmonisation process upon which 
the regulatory indices constructed in Section 4 are based. The main findings on the link 
between banking deregulation and harmonisation of banking legislation and growth are 
presented in Section 5 and 6. Section 7 analyses the specific transmission channels 
through which the policy changes considered here may affect output growth. Section 8 
puts forward some policy recommendations and then concludes. 
  
2 Existing Evidence on the Finance-Growth Nexus. 
  The positive link between financial development (both in terms of banks and 
stock markets) and real investment and growth has been well documented
2. Less 
consensus however has been reached on the direction of causality characterising the 
relationship. 
                                                 
2 See Levine (1997) for an authoritative survey on the theory and empirics of the relation between banks 
and stock markets with the real economy. 
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initial levels of banking development are correlated with future output and productivity 
growth as well as physical capital accumulation. However, Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
argue that the initial level of financial development may be just a leading indicator 
rather than a causal factor, since financial intermediaries may increase their lending in 
anticipation to faster economic growth in the future. 
As a way through the causality debate, some effort has been devoted to find 
factors that are closely related to financial development while unrelated to growth. La 
Porta et al. (1997, 1998) claim that legal origin is a crucial factor that has conditioned 
the degree of development and sophistication of both banks and stock markets over 
time. They note that those countries with French legal origin following a civil-law 
tradition show a systematically lower degree of development of financial systems. By 
contrast, those countries with an Anglo-Saxon legal origin based on jurisprudence 
following a common-law tradition show more developed and sophisticated financial 
systems, while those with German legal origin would fall in between. To the extent that 
legal origin has been exogenously imposed through colonialism and conquest, it could 
be used to shed some light on the unresolved issue of causality in the finance-growth 
nexus. 
Nevertheless, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that the postulated link between 
legal origin and the degree of financial development does not accord well with the facts. 
They show that while legal origin does not change over time, the degree of financial 
development has experienced important reversals over the 20
th century. They argue that 
there must be other factors behind the evolution of financial systems. They show that 
political factors such as the creation of interest groups opposed to the opening of 
domestic economies and the development of domestic financial systems (which would 
imply more competition) may be an alternative explanation of how financial systems 
have evolved over time. 
In this paper we investigate an alternative mechanism to help us shed some light 
on the supply-leading hypothesis that implies a direction of causality going from 
finance to growth, i.e. the lifting of capital and interest rate controls and the 
harmonisation of banking regulations that can be conceived as policy measures to 
influence banking sector conduct and the allocation of resources, which in turn may 
have a significant impact on investment and growth. To the extent that Member States 
have adopted the regulatory changes imposed by the EU Authorities through the 
introduction of Directives that have the character of binding laws at the national level, 
ECB • Working Paper No 266 • September 2003 9we can argue that any significant statistical link between these policy changes and 
growth may not merely reflect a contemporaneous correlation, but a causal link. 
Some favourable evidence for the existence of a positive causal link between 
banking deregulation and growth has been provided by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996). 
They analyse the effect that the relaxation of bank branch restrictions in the United 
States may have had on growth at the state level. Their results point to a positive growth 
effect resulting from intrastate branch reform through the transmission channel of 
greater quality of bank lending. 
  
3 Institutional Background 
  Over the last couple of decades most of the regulations and constraints imposed 
on banks by national authorities have been gradually dismantled. In the context of the 
Single Market, it was felt necessary to remove most of the legal barriers imposed on 
banking activity with the aim of generating more competitive pressure and in turn a 
better allocation of resources
3. 
As documented by Economic Research Europe Ltd, (1996), in a study for the 
European Commission, until the mid-eighties most EU banking systems were highly 
regulated. Interest rate regulations were common across EU countries with the 
exception of Germany and the Netherlands that fully deregulated them in 1981 and the 
United Kingdom in 1979. Controls on the free movement of capital were still in place 
by that time in Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. In addition, 
while branching restrictions were only in place in France, Italy and Portugal, in most 
countries there was a capital requirement at the branch level, which made competition 
through branching less efficient. In countries like Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain, banks were not allowed to be members of their domestic stock exchanges and the 
range of activities banks could engage in, was generally limited with clear restrictions 
on insurance and securities dealing. 
The liberalisation of the financial services industry has taken place gradually 
through two important moves. On the one hand, Member States have made a pre-
emptive movement to deregulate national banking sectors in the advent of the creation 
of a single market, lifting any restrictions on interest rates. On the other, there has been 
a process of approaching national banking legislations so as to harmonise regulations 
governing the banking industry across Europe, providing a level playing field for all 
                                                 
3 In the Cecchini report, 1988, it was estimated that the expected fall in banking prices would be up to 
34% in most financial services once the EC internal market is completed.  
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not distorted. 
  
3.1 Deregulation Process 
3.1.1 Restrictions on Quantities and Prices 
As mentioned above, interest rate regulatory measures such as ceilings and 
floors were widespread across EU countries in the 70’s and 80’s. These restrictions 
were particularly important in Austria, Belgium, France, Greece and Portugal, where 
monetary authorities, shaping the degree of efficiency of credit institutions, established 
most interest rates including rates on loans. These measures were normally 
accompanied by investment coefficients (and high reserve coefficients) by which credit 
institutions were compelled to devote some share of their liquid resources to finance 
government deficits by purchasing public bonds. As pointed out by Vives (1991), many 
countries also allowed coordinating movements and “cartel-type” tacit agreements that 
led deposit rates to be underpriced. These collusive practices were common in Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands and Spain. 
Quantitative restrictions on assets and liabilities were also in place in many EU 
countries up to the early nineties. As described by Vives (1990), reserve requirements 
remained with such high levels that banks in some Member States could not behave 
competitively with respect to some of their EU counterparts. In 1990, Spanish 
commercial and saving banks were compelled to posit 19% of a subset of their 
liabilities in the Bank of Spain. These excessive reserve coefficients were also 
widespread in Greece, Sweden, France and Italy. In Belgium these restrictions 




3.1.2 Liberalisation of Capital Controls 
With regard to the liberalisation of capital flows, article 67(1) of the original 
EEC Treaty was explicit by requiring that during the transition towards a common 
European market, Member States should progressively abolish all restrictions on the 
movement of capital across Member States, removing also any discriminatory 
restriction based on nationality. However, the Treaty did not specify the transactions to 
                                                 
4 For further details on the regulatory environment in the EU see Gual and Neven (1993). See also Dixon 
(1990) for detailed information on Greece and Italy, Englund (1990) for the case of Sweden, Vives (1991) 
for Spain and Melitz (1990) for France.  
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proper functioning of the common market”. 
Some progress was made with the First and Second Council Directives covering 
article 67 of the Treaty. Essentially, these Directives divided capital movements into 
several categories to which a different degree of liberalisation was applied, thereby 
separating out those transactions that need not be liberalised at all from the rest. Most 
remarkably, the cross-border opening of deposit and current accounts and the granting 
of personal loans were not liberalised which constituted a clear obstacle to the 
development of cross-border retail banking. 
More stringent measures were laid down by Directive 88/361 inspired by the 
Single European Act, which established the basic principle of freedom of capital 
movement as to reach the character of binding law for Member States by July 1990, 
except in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain that were given an extension until 1992 to 
adopt the Directive
5. Without giving an exhaustive list of transactions, Directive 88/361 
conceived capital to include among others: direct investment, investment in real estate, 
operations with securities taking place in regulated capital markets, operations involving 
units of collective undertakings, deposit and current accounts, credit and loans for both 
a commercial and financial purpose, personal transfers of capital and physical transfers 
of financial assets. Therefore, this Directive helped lift some of the remaining legal 
barriers associated with both wholesale and retail banking. 
With the adoption of the Treaty on the European Union in November 1993, 
article 67 of the Treaty of Rome was replaced by article 73 of the Maastricht Treaty that 
applies the principle of full freedom of capital movements. 
  
3.2 Harmonisation Process 
3.2.1 Basic Legislation 
The first important step in the harmonisation process of approaching national 
legislations was given in 1973 through the adoption of Council Directive 73/183, by 
which the restrictions on freedom of establishment and provision of financial services 
by credit institutions in other Member States were removed. In addition, credit 
institutions operating in the same country would be subject to equal prudential and 
supervisory rules (national treatment principle). In practice, this Directive did not have 
much impact since in most Member States there still remained many restrictions on the 
                                                 
5 Council Directive 92/122 gave authorisation to Greece to defer the liberalisation of certain capital 
movements until 1995. Portugal was extended until 1995 also because of adjustment difficulties. 
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minimum level of capital. 
Another important piece of legislation was the First Banking Directive on the 
Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the 
Taking Up and Pursuit of Credit Institutions (Directive 77/780), which defined a credit 
institution as “an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits and other repayable 
funds from the public and to grant credit for its own account”.  
Important progress was made with the adoption of the Second Banking Directive 
(Directive 89/646, SBD hereafter) that was inspired in the White Paper signed in 1985 
by the European Commission by which there was a shift from detailed harmonisation of 
rules to a system that effectively combines minimum harmonisation of rules with the 
principle of mutual recognition and home country control. The principle of mutual 
recognition implies that any credit institution and certain financial institutions 
authorised to operate in their home country are granted a “single passport”, being able 
to open branches and provide services in any other EU country without the need of 
further authorisation from host country authorities. By replacing the responsibility of 
supervising banks from the host to the home country, the SBD ensured that the same 
Member State that grants a charter to a credit institution under the “Single Banking 
Licence” agreement would be the one controlling and supervising its activities 
independent of its place of operation
6.  
The principle of minimum harmonisation entails the harmonisation of uniform 
prudential standards in all Member States to the extent to ensure the stability and 
soundness of the banking industry as well as the existence of similar competitive 
conditions for all credit institutions operating in different Member States. Though 
Member States are allowed to set more stringent prudential and regulatory standards, by 
virtue of the principle of mutual recognition no Member State will tend to deviate from 
those minimum standards since that would act against the interest of its national credit 
institutions operating under competitive disadvantage in less restrictive Member States. 
Likewise, the SBD opened up a process of competitive deregulation (what has been 
often called “a race to the bottom”) in the range of banking activities permitted in EU 
                                                 
6 Host country supervisory authorities continue having the discretionary power to intervene in matters 
concerning liquidity, monetary policy and when it is in the public’s interest.  
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model
7.  
The SBD set some minimum prudential standards such as a minimum capital 
requirement of EUR 5 millions for credit institutions and clear limitations on their 
participations in non-financial firms as well as shifting the capital requirement from the 
branch to the bank level, reducing in turn the cost of opening new offices
8. 
The liberalisation of capital flows and the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition were expected to trigger cross-border banking activity, bringing about 
intensified competition among banks, which could lead some institutions to take 
excessive risks in order to remain in the industry. The SBD thus called for more 
Directives on setting further prudential standards, on improving the disclosure of 
information by credit institutions and measures to protect the interest of consumers of 
financial services. This is in part why the EU harmonisation of banking regulations has 
been considered as a re-regulatory move aimed at maintaining the stability and 
soundness of the banking industry, but posing some costs to the financial services 
industry. Indeed, the process of regulatory harmonisation has implied tighter regulation 
for some countries while deregulation for some others such as Germany and 
Luxembourg that have generally imposed more stringent capital requirements. As noted 
above, by virtue of the principle of mutual recognition Member States will not have the 
incentive to set prudential standards above EU levels, since that would act in detriment 
of domestic institutions. So deregulatory competition will lead prudential standards to 
converge towards the EU benchmark.  
  
3.2.2 Prudential Measures 
  Directive 83/350 further amended by Directive 92/30 introduced the principle of 
supervision at the consolidated level, leading credit institutions to adopt accounting 
rules with the aim of presenting consolidated accounts for the whole group. Other 
Directives regulating prudential standards are those governing the own funds
9, large 
exposures and the application of the solvency ratio
10,11. 
                                                 
7 The banking model precognised by the SBD is the Universal Banking Model, which allows banks to 
carry on traditional activities such as deposit acceptance and the granting of loans in addition to 
investment activities such as money brokering, portfolio management and securities underwriting. 
8 As documented by Economic Research Europe Ltd (1996), there was a 58% increase in cross-border 
branching in the three years following the SBD. 
9 Directive 89/299 in addition to Directives 91/633 and 92/16, which both amend the former. 
10 The main Solvency Ratio Directive is Directive 89/647; which is amended several times. See Table 1 
below. 
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absorb losses. The Own Funds Directive uses a two-tier classification by dividing the 
own funds into tier-1 capital that comprises mainly equity and reserves and tier-2 capital 
that involves those funds the credit institution can dispose of for a limited period such as 
subordinated debt. The solvency ratio constitutes the legal instrument that ensures a 
sufficient degree of capitalisation of credit institutions and expresses own funds as a 
proportion of risk-adjusted assets and off-balance-sheet items. The risk-weights are 
assigned by differentiating between three main categories: central banks, central 
governments and credit institutions and on the basis of the procedence of the borrower. 
This allows a reliable assessment of the financial health and solvency of financial 
institutions. The minimum solvency ratio of a credit institution will be 8% of the risk-
adjusted own funds
12. 
The Directive on the control of large exposures regulates the assets and off-
balance-sheet items so that a large exposure may not exceed 40% of the own funds of a 
credit institution and overall cannot exceed 800% of the own funds of the institution
13.  
  
3.2.3 Accounting and Disclosure Regulatory Measures 
  Directive 86/635 on Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts of Credit 
Institutions and Directives 83/349, 90/604 and 90/605 on Annual Accounts aim at 
making it feasible for creditors, borrowers, owners and the public to have access to 
comprehensive and comparable information on the accounts of credit institutions 
operating in different Member States. This is achieved by laying down uniform rules as 
well as the terminology used by credit institutions when presenting the balance sheet 
and the profit-and-loss account. 
Two other Directives govern the accounting obligations of branches. More 
specifically, Directive 89/117 rules the way branches established in a Member State of 
credit and financial institutions having their heads outside that Member State should 
publish their annual accounts. The eleventh Council Directive 89/666 concerns the 
disclosure requirements of branches opened in a Member State by certain types of 
company governed by the law of another Member State. Through these Directives, 
branches opened in EU countries do not have any longer to publish separate accounts 
                                                                                                                                               
11 These Directives are largely based on the 1988 Capital Accord of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision signed by the G10 that shifted the emphasis from conduct regulations to prudential regulatory 
measures such as more stringent capital requirements. 
12 For further details on the different aspects in the calculation of the solvency ratio, see Usher (2000). 
13 A large exposure is assumed to equal or exceed 15% of the credit institution’s own funds. 
ECB • Working Paper No 266 • September 2003 15from those of their head offices. Rather, the whole financial group will have to 
consolidate their accounts. 
  
3.2.4 Measures to Protect Consumers and to Fight against Fraud 
Directives 91/308 and 2001/97 on Money Laundering aim at strengthening 
international cooperation and the exchange of information in order to prevent the use of 
the financial system to commit fraud. Direct measures to protect consumers include 
Directive 94/9 on Deposit Guarantee Schemes that establishes a mandatory insurance 
guarantee scheme with the aim of maintaining consumers’ confidence. This Directive 
sets a minimum coverage per depositor equal to 90% of the deposits with the limit of 
EUR 20.000.  
Directives 87/102 and 90/88 on the approximation of laws concerning consumer 
credit have the objective of ensuring that consumers are provided with appropriate 
information about the terms and conditions of any credit obtained from a credit 
institution. Directive 93/13 deals with the issue of unfair contracts not only in the area 
of financial services but also in other fields.  
 
3.2.5 Regulatory Measures on the Payment System 
The European Authorities have stressed the need to regulate payment systems, 
since the introduction of the euro was expected to trigger the rise in the number of 
cross-border transfers of funds and transactions involving capital. Two main Directives 
have been adopted on that regard. Directive 97/5 on cross-border credit transfers is 
concerned with the approximation of domestic and cross-border payment systems, so 
that individuals and firms could transfer funds from one Member State to another more 
reliably, quickly and at a lower cost
14. 
Directive 98/26 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement 
systems puts forward a common set of rules to protect participants in payment systems 
in the event that one member has gone insolvent so that his collateral can be enforced by 
the other participants. 
 
                                                 
14 In July 2001 the European Council adopted the Regulation on Cross-Border Payments in Euro. The 
Regulation covers cross-border payments of up to 12.500 euros, requiring credit institutions to charge the 
same commissions and fees for cross-border and domestic card payments and withdrawals from cash 
dispensers. 
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As recognised in the literature
15, the SBD has followed a criterion based on the 
institutional definition of an undertaking rather than on the functions it carries out when 
granting the “single passport”. The combination of this narrow definition of institutions 
with its wide functional scope of application is clearly beneficial to those countries with 
a universal banking system. In order to provide a level playing field for non-bank 
institutions that carry on any functions covered by the SBD but whose definition does 
not match that of credit institution, the European Authorities have extended the 
principle of mutual recognition in two ways: 1) by allowing non-bank subsidiaries of 
banks and 2) by means of further Directives applied to investment firms and collective 
units of transferable securities. 
Directive 93/6 regulates the investment services and securities brokerage 
business carried on by investment firms and those credit institutions authorised by the 
SBD
16. The Investment Services Directive (ISD hereafter) follows the philosophy of the 
SBD in that the principles of single passport, mutual recognition and home country 
control are applied. The ISD also called for the tightening of prudential standards to 
cover market risks associated with securities brokerage and measures to protect the 
interest of investors. The Capital Adequacy Directive requires those undertakings 
covered by the ISD to reserve a proportion of their funds to insure against any 
contingency associated with open market positions. Directive 97/9 on Investor 
Compensation Scheme is the instrument used to protect the interest of investors in the 
case of failure of an investment firm. It covers for at least 90% of any loss, with the 
upper limit of EUR 20.000.  
Directive 85/611 amended by Directive 88/220, regulates the undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities. The main activity of these UCITS, 
whose units can be re-purchased or redeemed out of their assets, is to invest in 
transferable securities of capital raised from individual investors with the aim of 
diversifying risks. The UCITS Directives apply the same basic principles to UCITS than 
the SDB did for credit institutions. Nonetheless, UCITS will have to comply with host 
country rules on marketing under the “general good clause”. Another drawback of the 
UCITS Directive is that managers and depositories of UCITS are not entitled to be 
                                                 
15 See for instance, Carossio (1990). 
16 The list of investment services includes: the placing, brokerage and underwriting of securities and 
services associated with portfolio management and the provision of advice and expertise. These services 
can be applied to transferable securities, money market instruments and exchange and interest rate 
instruments. 




3.2.7 Late Measures for the Completion of Regulatory Harmonisation and 
Financial Integration 
  Recently Directive 2000/12 amended by Directive 2000/28 has coded in a single 
text seven Directives alongside their corresponding amendments with the aim of 
providing a comprehensive and unified code covering all the Directives on the taking up 
and pursuit of business of credit institutions, avoiding any overlapping among them
18. 
The adoption of the “Banking Code” is one of the many initiatives that the Financial 
Services Action Plan endorsed in 1999 has put forward in order to achieve a single 
market for wholesale financial services and secure the retail financial sector along with 
the adoption of state-of-the-art prudential rules and supervisory procedures by 2005.  
Further impetus to these initiatives has been imparted by the ECOFIN that 
established the Committee of Wise Men in July 2000, who recognised the benefits that 
could be reaped from a fully integrated financial industry. They claim that “the EU has 
no divine right to the benefits of an integrated financial market. It has to capture those 
benefits by building an integrated European market in many areas starting from a very 
low level. If this does not succeed, economic growth, employment and prosperity will 
be lower”. 
The Report of the Committee of Wise Men also notes that the current regulatory 
system based mainly on Directives has a number of drawbacks: it is too slow and too 
rigid to quickly adapt to changes in market conditions, it produces too much ambiguity 
in the implementation process, being also unable to distinguish between essential 
principles and practical rules. The Wise Men Committee has proposed a shift from the 
use of Directives to that of Regulations, which are binding laws and take automatic 
precedence over national laws without further need of passing implementing legislation 
at the national level.  
                                                 
17 In December 2001, the European Council adopted two Directives amending the UCITS Directive. 
Directive 2001/108 called “Product Directive” removes barriers to cross-border marketing of units of 
funds and widens the number of assets UCITS can invest in by including bank deposits, money market 
instruments, the units of other non-UCITS collective investment undertakings and options and futures 
among others. The “Manager Directive” (2001/107) allows managers of UCITS to be granted “the single 
passport”. 
18 The “Banking Code” comprises Directive 73/183 on Freedom of Establishment, The First and Second 
Banking Directives, the Solvency Ratio and Own Funds Directives, Directive 92/30 on the Supervision of 
Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis and Directive 92/121 on Large Exposures. 
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the financial services industry. The process of full integration of wholesale markets can 
be seen as complete while the retail-banking sector is in the process of realisation. 
However, there may be natural barriers that may impede the full integration of the retail 
banking industry such as the existence of reputation effects, the cost of the 
establishment of a network of branches or the existence of switching costs to be 
incurred by consumers when changing from one bank to another. 
  
4 Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data Construction 
In this section we explain the indexes constructed to proxy for the process of 
banking deregulation and harmonisation of banking laws in the EU outlined in the 
previous section. We distinguish between both processes since they may have a 
different impact on growth. 
The deregulation index (DERI) is based on the dates when the total liberalisation 
of capital controls and interest rates took place, which are provided by Gual (1999). 
Accordingly, DERI is the sum of a capital control and an interest rate indicator of 
deregulation. Each indicator assigns a value of 1 to the dates where full liberalisation is 
in place. So the deregulation index can take a maximum value of 2. 
The harmonisation index is constructed on the basis of the implementation dates 
of the main Council Directives affecting the banking activity. We build on the work by 
Gual (1999) that created a data set with the implementation dates of some banking 
Directives over the period 1981-1995 for twelve EU countries. We extend the data set 
by including the EFTA countries that joined the EU in January 1995, i. e. Austria, 
Finland and Sweden, and by extending the implementation period from the sixties to the 
present. We also consider a more exhaustive list of Directives covering a much wider 
range of aspects of the banking industry that have been subject to harmonisation. We 
diverge from Gual (1999) in that we distinguish between strict deregulatory measures 
and harmonisation measures, thus constructing two separate indexes. As shown in table 
(1) our harmonisation index is constructed on the basis of six indicators covering all the 
Banking Directives implemented in the EU since the sixties until 2001
19. 
The Basic Indicator is based upon the three pillar Directives. Each Directive is 
assigned a value of one from the year of implementation at the national level until 2001. 
                                                 
19 The latest Directives are not included in the index, since they have not been generally implemented at 
the national level by the end of the period under scrutiny. 
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credit institutions. Four main Directives regulate the prudential standards in the EU: the 
Directive on Consolidated Surveillance and the Directives governing the own funds, the 
solvency ratio and the large exposures of credit institutions. We assign to each of these 
main four aspects a value equal to one of which 0.5 goes to the first Directive regulating 
the issue and the rest for its subsequent amendments
20. By proceeding in this way, we 
put more weight on the first directive than on each subsequent amendment that in many 
cases just slightly modifies the former. 
The third indicator is based on those Directives governing the accounting and 
disclosure obligations of credit institutions and their branches. It takes a value of two 
since it builds on the Annual and Consolidated Accounts Directive (86/635) and the 
Directive governing the accounting obligations of branches opened within the EU. The 
fourth indicator regulates the pursuit of investment and securities firms and builds on 
four main Directives: the UCITS Directive, the Investment Services Directive, the 
Capital Adequacy Directive and the Investor Compensation Scheme Directive. The fifth 
indicator covers those Directives aimed at protecting consumers of financial services 
and fighting against financial fraud and is based upon five main Directives. The last 
indicator covers the Directives pursuing the approximation of payment systems in the 
EU.  
The overall harmonisation index sums over the six indicators. The maximum 
value in a given period can be 20 and would correspond to a period when all banking 
Directives considered had been yet implemented. Therefore, this index is expected to 
take a value closer to 20 by the end of the period covered in the study
21. It should also 
be noticed that sometimes the actual national implementation of a Council Directive is 
earlier than the publication of the Council Directive. This stems from the fact that a 
particular national law already in place at the time when the Directive is published may 
be more stringent than the EU counterpart. Sometimes, it happens that some Directives 
are gradually implemented as reflected by subsequent national laws adopted over 
several years
22.  
                                                 
20 For instance, we assign a value of 0.5 to the Solvency Ratio Directive (89/647), and the rest half a point 
is divided among all the subsequent Directives amending Directive 89/647. 
21 Therefore, those countries adopting EU Directives early will have a harmonisation index that reaches 
its maximum value earlier than in those countries where the adoption took place later. In some cases the 
harmonisation index may take on a value lower than 20 by 2001 if some of the Council Directives have 
not been yet implemented. 
22 In this case, we deviate slightly from Gual in the way we compute the indicator. For instance, The SBD 
was adopted in Belgium through several laws that were implemented in 1990, 1993 and 1994. While we 
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TABLE 1: HARMONISATION INDEX 
DIRECTIVE DIR. CODE  WEIGHT  OBJECTIVE 
BASIC INDICATOR (I1)      
FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT DIRECTIVE 73/183  1  BASIC  INDICATOR 
FIRST BANKING DIRECTIVE   77/780  1  BASIC INDICATOR 
SECOND BANKING DIRECTIVE  89/646  1  BASIC INDICATOR 
   3  POINTS   
PRUDENTIAL HARMONISATION INDICATOR (I2)      
CONSOLIDATED SURVEILLANCE DIRECTIVE 83/350  0.5  PRUDENTIAL 
MODIF CONS. SURVEILLANCE DIRECTIVE  92/30  0.5  PRUDENTIAL 
OWN FUNDS  DIRECTIVE  89/299  0.5  PRUDENTIAL 
MODIF. OWN FUNDS DIRECTIVE 91/633  0.25  PRUDENTIAL 
MODIF. OWN FUNDS DIRECTIVE  92/16  0.25  PRUDENTIAL 
SOLVENCY RATIO DIRECTIVE   89/647  0.5  PRUDENTIAL 
MODIF. TO SOLVENCY RATIO DIRECTIVE  94/7  0.1  PRUDENTIAL 
MODIF. TO SOLVENCY RATIO DIRECTIVE  91/31 0.1 PRUDENTIAL 
MODIF. TO SOLVENCY RATIO DIRECTIVE  95/15 0.1 PRUDENTIAL 
MODIF. TO SOLVENCY RATIO DIRECTIVE  98/32 0.1 PRUDENTIAL 
MODIF. TO SOLVENCY RATIO DIRECTIVE  98/33 0.1 PRUDENTIAL 
LARGE EXPOSURES DIRECTIVE   92/121  1  PRUDENTIAL 
   4  POINTS   
ACCOUNTING AND DISCLOSURE INDICATOR (I3)      
ANNUAL AND CONSOLIDATED ACCOUNTS DIRECTIVE   86/635  0.5  ACCOUNTING 
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF CERTAIN FIRMS DIRECTIVE  78/660  0.1  ACCOUNTING 
CONSOLIDATED ACCOUNTS DIRECTIVE 83/349  0.1  ACCOUNTING 
MODIF. 78-660 AND 83/349  W.R.T. TO SMES  90/604  0.1  ACCOUNTING 
MODIF. 78-660 AND 83/349 W.R.T. TO SCOPE OF DIR.  90/605  0.1  ACCOUNTING 
MODIF. 78-660 W.R.T. THE AMOUNTS EXPRESSED IN ECUS   94/8  0.1  ACCOUNTING 
BRANCH ESTABLISHMENT & HEAD OFFICES OUTSIDE  THE EU  89/117  0.5  ACCOUNTING 
BRANCHES OPENED IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE  89/666  0.5  ACCOUNTING 
   2  POINTS   
OTHER NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS INDICATOR(I4)      
UCITS DIRECTIVE  85/611  0.5  LEVEL PLAYING 
MODIF. TO UCITS DIRECTIVE  88/220  0.25  LEVEL PLAYING 
INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE (ISD)   93/22  0.75  LEVEL PLAYING 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF INV FIRMS AND CREDIT INST. (CAD)  93/6  0.5  PRUDENTIAL 
MODIF. TO CAPITAL ADEQUACY DIRECTIVE  98/31  0.25  PRUDENTIAL 
MODIF. TO UCITS, ISD, CAD AND SOLVENCY RATIO DIRECTIVE.  95/26  0.75  LEVEL PLAY.& PRUD. 
INVESTOR COMPENSATION SCHEME DIRECTIVE. 97/9  1  PRUDENTIAL 
   4  POINTS   
CONSUMER PROTECTION INDICATOR (I5)      
MONEY LAUNDERING  DIRECTIVE 91/308  1  FINANCIAL  FRAUD 
CONSUMER CREDIT DIRECTIVE   87/102  1  CONSUMER PROT. 
CONSUMER CREDIT DIRECTIVE   90/88  1  CONSUMER PROT. 
UNFAIR TERMS IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS  DIRECTIVE  93/13  1  CONSUMER PROT. 
DEPOSIT GUARANTEE SCHEME DIRECTIVE  94/19  1  CONSUMER PROT. 
   5  POINTS   
PAYMENT SYSTEM INDICATOR (I6)      
CROSS-BORDER CREDIT DIRECTIVE   97/5  1  PAYMENT SYSTEM 
PAYMENT AND SEC. SETTLEMENT SYSTEM DIRECTIVE  98/26 1  PAYMENT  SYSTEM 
   2  POINTS     
 
 
The proxy we use for the level of banking activity is the ratio of private credit by 
deposit money banks (DMB) to GDP and represents claims on the private sector made 
                                                                                                                                               
assign a value of one third to each of those specific years, Gual assigns a value of 0.2 to each year 
covering the period 1990-1994. 
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claims made by the Central Bank since we are trying to capture the efficiency in the 
allocation of credit. We follow Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) in deflating the ratio 
of private credit to GDP. They note that credit granted by DMB represents a stock 
variable and GDP can be seen as a flow variable. Since stock variables are measured at 
the end of the period and flow variables are measured relative to the whole period, we 
deflate private credit with the end of the year consumer price index (normally the CPI of 
December) and GDP is deflated using the annual CPI. We use the following expression 





























where the subscript e, a relates to end of the period and average value respectively
23. 
Data for real GDP per capita in constant 1995 PPP prices used to compute output 
growth were obtained from the Economic Outlook published by the OECD
24. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The national implementation of EU Directives has taken place gradually and has 
differed across countries. In figures 1 and 2 presented in the appendix, we depict the 
evolution of the harmonisation and deregulation indexes from 1960 to 2001. Over the 
seventies there were few important moves towards the harmonisation of banking 
legislations. By 1985 the harmonisation index normally takes on a value lower than 2, 
with the exception of France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. With 
regard to the deregulation of interest rates and liberalisation of capital controls, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom had dismantled any restrictions by 
1981. Therefore, we can consider these three countries and to a less extent France as 
early deregulators relative to the rest. By 1990 the harmonisation index reaches a value 
greater than four in the early deregulators as well as in Denmark and Spain that quickly 
began lifting constraints on branching, capital controls and interest rates during the 
eighties. The interval going from 1990-1995 constituted the period of faster adoption of 
Council Directives at the national level. By 1995 the harmonisation index takes on a 
                                                 
23 The data were retrieved from the International Financial Statistics Database (IMF). Line 99b relates to 
gross domestic product in LCU and line 64 for CPI. For bank credit to the private sector, we use line 22d.  
24 See table (A1) in the appendix for the definition of the data used in the study along with the data 
sources. 
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By that time all restrictions on interest rates and capital controls had also been lifted. 
According to our harmonisation index, the proportion of Directives adopted by the end 
of 2001 varies across Member States. The percentage appears equal or greater than 85% 
in all countries apart from Italy, Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In 
Belgium, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Luxembourg the percentage 
of adoption is greater than 90%. Spain appears as the Member State that has 
implemented more Directives with a percentage of adoption equal to 99.5%
25. 
Simultaneous to this process of harmonisation of banking regulations, there has 
been a steady increase in banking activity. The ratio of private credit to GDP has 
steadily increased in all countries since the early sixties with the notable exception of 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden, where there has been a reversal in the trend as a result 
of the bank insolvency episodes taking place in the early nineties. 
  
5 Empirical Analysis 
In this section we estimate the impact that the process of financial liberalisation 
and harmonisation of banking legislation in the EU may have exerted on growth over 
the period 1960-2001. Considering that the pace of adoption of Council Directives has 
differed across countries and over time, the use of panel data techniques should allow us 
to take advantage of the within and between variability of the data. A further advantage 
over standard cross-section regressions is that panel techniques can better control for 
omitted factors by including country-specific effects and for business cycle effects 
through time dummies
26. Nevertheless, the inclusion when unnecessary of such country-
specific and year-specific effects takes away the between and within variability of the 
data. As a result, we will carry out an ANOVA analysis of the variance for each 
regression in order to determine whether to include country or time-specific effects or 
both. We perform the analysis of variance test for common means across individuals, 
across time, or both applied to the residuals from the regression across the entire data 
set. 
                                                 
25 The harmonisation index should give a good idea of the pace of harmonisation of banking legislation in 
the EU as well as of the effort made by Member States to transcribe Council Directives to National Laws. 
Nonetheless, in exceptional cases the fact that a country has not adopted a specific Directive by the end of 
the period, may not reflect any disadvantage in relation to a country that has adopted it. Italy that did not 
adopt Directive 73/183 on Freedom of Establishment constitutes a clear example since once the First 
Banking Directive came into place, Directive 73/183 lost relevance. 
26 The inclusion of country-specific effects may also help controlling for the convergence of income 
levels that has taken place in the EU in the post-war period. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). 
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policy changes given by banking deregulation and the harmonisation of regulatory 
standards of the financial services industry in the EU, is that our indicators could be 
proxying for some other specific episodes taking place during the period under 
consideration. More specifically, we are concerned about the episodes of systemic 
banking crises that have occurred in the EU over the last 30 years as a result of fast 
financial deregulation without having sufficiently strengthened the regulatory and 
supervisory framework of financial institutions. In the aftermath of the crises these 
countries took important steps to strengthen their prudential and accounting standards 
by adopting BIS capital adequacy standards and better accounting and disclosure 
measures. 
Therefore, once we control for these major episodes of banking insolvencies, we 
should capture the effect that the institutional changes have had on growth beyond their 
effect on any major banking crisis. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996a) have documented 
major bank insolvency episodes in Spain over 1977-1985 and in 1994 with Banesto, 
Sweden in 1991, Finland over the period 1991-1993, France during 1994-1995 and 
some episodes of borderline crises in Germany during the late 1970s and in 1989, and in 
the United Kingdom from 1974 to 1976. We thus construct a variable called CRISIS 
that takes on a value of unity for those countries and those years when a major banking 
crisis was in place. 
Model 1 estimates the basic growth regression controlling for the variable 
CRISIS and the harmonisation index (that we denote henceforth by HI). The test for 
common means in the time and cross-section dimensions are easily rejected at the 1% 
significance level, which points to the need of controlling for time and country-specific 
effects. HI appears significant and with a positive sign. The variable CRISIS shows the 
expected sign and implies a decrease in growth at the EU level of around 1.5% as a 
result of episodes of financial distress. Model 2 estimates the same model but allowing 
for a heterogeneous slope on the CRISIS variable for each country suffering a major 
banking crisis since it may be reasonable to consider that country-specific episodes of 
financial distress affected mainly the country suffering it. We tested for the restriction 
implied by the CRISIS variable, rejecting slope homogeneity at the 6% confidence 
level. Therefore, from now on we allow for a heterogeneous slope on the crisis 
indicator. The crisis dummy appears highly significant in Finland, France, Spain and 
Sweden while insignificant in Germany and the UK. The size of the coefficients gives a 
good idea of the detrimental effect of each banking crisis. The financial crisis in Finland 
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capita in 1991 was -7.5%. In Sweden, the 1991 crisis reduced growth by almost 2.5%. 
In France and Spain growth dropped by almost 1% and 1.8% respectively
27. Once we 
allow for heterogeneous slopes on the CRISIS variable, HI reduces in magnitude by 
around 30% with respect to model 1 and remains significant at 5%. Still the coefficient 
on HI implies that the adoption of Directives equivalent to 10 points (of 20 that the 
index can take) has brought about a 1.65% increase in output growth, which is 
equivalent to around 55% of the unconditional mean of per capita output growth in the 
EU over the period 1960-2001. 
Following Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), we test for the existence of regional 
business cycles that could drive a spurious positive relation between HI and output 
growth
28. We split the sample in four main regions on the basis of the patterns followed 
in the deregulation and harmonisation process. We consider a group of early 
deregulators formed by the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and France. A second group 
consisting of the EFTA countries (Austria, Sweden and Finland) that joined the EU in 
1995 and quickly implemented many of the Directives already in place in other Member 
States. A third group consists of the Southern European countries (Greece, Portugal and 
Spain) and Ireland that have experienced both fast economic growth over the nineties 
and a quick implementation of Banking Directives in that period. This group may be 
particularly influential in obtaining a spurious positive coefficient on HI for the panel as 
a whole. The fourth group consists of Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Luxembourg. 
Therefore, we again estimate model 2 but allowing for region-specific time effects, 
being unable to reject the null of homogeneous time effects for the whole EU even at 
10%. We also experimented with a model that allows for region-specific time effects for 
early deregulators, the Southern group and a residual group containing the rest and we 
could not reject the null of homogeneous time effects. Therefore, we dismiss the 
possibility of region-specific business cycles driving the finance-growth relation
29. In 
model 3 we further estimate model 2 but allowing for a different slope on HI for each 
region. The coefficients on the HI terms are significant at least at 10%, but we are 
                                                 
27 This estimated detrimental growth impact from major banking crises should not come as a surprise 
since as documented by Caprio and Klingebiel (1996a) the rescue costs amounted to 8% of GDP in 
Finland and to 6.4% of GDP in Sweden. In Spain the estimated losses incurred by banks were equal to 
16.8% of the gross national product. 
28 The model with regional time effects would be: growthi,t = θj,t+αi+β*HIi,t+Σγi*CRISESi,t+εi,t  for j equal 
to 4 in our case, as opposed to the model without regional time dummies given by growthi,t  = 
θt+αi+β*HIi,t+Σγi*CRISESi,t+εi,t . The cost in terms of degrees of freedom is thus 120. 
29 The F-statistics are presented at the bottom of table (2). 
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homogeneous coefficient on HI for the whole EU is unlikely to be misspecified. 
Considering that the harmonisation index covers several aspects that may exert a 
different impact on growth, model 4 controls for the six indicators upon which HI is 
based, which may induce multicollinearity problems. We thus run separate regressions 
controlling for only one indicator at a time. 
Model 4 renders a negative growth effect from the indicator measuring the 
prudential and supervisory regulations imposed on credit institutions in order to 
maintain the stability and soundness of the banking industry
30. This finding may reflect 
that the harmonisation of prudential standards across the EU for some Member States 
has constituted a movement to tightening regulation. That has made the financial 
intermediation process more costly as suggested by Gual (1999), with a negative impact 
on the efficiency in the allocation of resources to productive use. By contrast, the 
indicator on accounting and disclosure standards renders a significantly positive 
coefficient in line with other studies such as La Porta et al. (1998) and Levine (1998) 
who find that an index of accounting standards can condition the degree of development 
of financial markets, affecting in turn growth. The indicators on consumer protection 
and payment systems are significantly positive at 10%. Models 5 to 10 represent growth 
regressions with one indicator at a time. Again, models 7 and 9 yield a significantly 
positive coefficient on the accounting indicator and consumer protection indicator 
respectively. 
Table (3) presents the results on the growth effect of the deregulation of interest 
rates and the liberalisation of capital controls. Model 11 renders an insignificant 
coefficient on the banking deregulation index (DERI). In models 12 to 15 we analyse 
separately the growth impact of interest rate deregulation (IRI) and capital controls 
liberalisation (CCI). No significant effect arises from interest rate deregulation. In 
contrast, the liberalisation of capital controls appears to positively affect growth. Model 
14 renders a coefficient on CCI implying that the lifting of capital controls in the EU 
has brought about an increase in long-run output growth by almost 0.6%, which is 
equivalent to around 21% of the unconditional mean of per capita output growth 
experienced in the EU during 1960-2001
31. In model 15 we tried to estimate the 
separate growth effects of HI and CCI, but both coefficients were insignificant due to  
                                                 
30 See Table (A1) in the appendix for the notation of each variable used in the regressions. 
31 As a robustness check, we tested for the existence of regional time effects in model 14, but we did not 
find statistical evidence supporting it. We also tested for the existence of region-specific time effects in 
the group of early deregulators, the group that includes Southern EU countries and Ireland and a residual 
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MODEL  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
HI   0.240*** 0.165**          
  (2.822) (1.970)         
CRISFIN   -4.969*** -4.980*** -4.847*** -5.293*** -5.660*** -4.757*** -5.364*** -5.262*** -5.403***
    (-2.741) (-2.743) (-2.381) (-2.945) (-2.978) (-2.536) (-3.010) (-2.968) (-3.037) 
CRISFRA   -0.973*** -0.895*** -0.831**  -1.092*** -1.038*** -1.266V  -1.102*** -0.946*** -1.106***
    (-3.035) (-2.729) (-2.214) (-3.371) (-3.140) (-3.682) (-3.523) (-2.850) (-3.461) 
CRISGER   0.371 0.349 0.290 0.345 0.429 0.553 0.468 0.500 0.500 
    (0.747) (0.700) (0.558) (0.656) (0.809) (1.074) (0.900) (0.967) (0.955) 
CRISESP   -1.850*** -1.830*** -1.696*** -1.945*** -2.158*** -1.919*** -2.082*** -2.096*** -2.067***
    (-3.499) (-3.383) (-2.976) (-3.648) (-4.308) (-3.756) (-4.171) (-4.186) (-4.151) 
CRISSWE  -2.493*** -2.501*** -1.818*** -2.740*** -2.613*** -2.158*** -2.687*** -2.332*** -2.708***
    (-4.217) (-4.234) (-2.838) (-4.967) (-5.086) (-3.429) (-4.918) (-3.924) (-4.959) 
CRISUK    -0.374 -0.417 -0.334 -0.345 -0.377 -0.283 -0.359 -0.464 -0.364 
    (-0.381) (-0.426) (-0.344) (-0.352) (-0.380) (-0.285) (-0.361) (-0.467) (-0.367) 
REG1HI    0.151*         
    (1.708)         
REG2HI     0.159*         
    (1.751)         
REG3HI     0.168**         
    (1.977)         
REG4HI     0.165*         
    (1.913)         
I1     0.259  0.171       
     (1.338)  (0.916)       
I2     -0.594*   -0.405      
     (-1.890)   (-1.434)      
I3     1.041***    0.978***     
     (2.795)    (2.528)     
I4     0.228     0.054    
     (1.330)     (0.370)    
I5     0.257*      0.298*   
     (1.762)      (1.933)   
I6     0.342*       0.240 
     (1.751)       (1.239) 
CRISIS  -1.556***           
   (-3.434)           
ANOVA            
INDIV  4.234*** 4.500*** 2.659*** 5.610*** 5.635*** 4.119*** 3.878*** 3.537*** 4.787*** 3.910*** 
TIME      16.57*** 16.315*** 16.12*** 16.84*** 17.01*** 15.196*** 15.70*** 13.175*** 14.993*** 9.462*** 
JOINT     13.37*** 13.252*** 12.63*** 13.92*** 14.06*** 12.324*** 12.63*** 10.676*** 12.347*** 8.023*** 
R
2  0.746 0.751 0.751 0.754 0.750 0.751 0.752 0.750 0.751 0.750 
UsableObs 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 
F(5,553)=  2.184 with Significance Level 0.0546. Null of homogeneity of CRISIS versus country-specific CRISIS variables. 
F(120,433)= 0.993 with Significance Level 0.507. Null of homogeneity of time dummies versus regional time effects 
F(80,473)=  1.108 with Significance Level 0.258. Null of homogeneity of time dummies versus heterogeneous regional time  
effects in the early deregulators group and Southern countries and a residual category with the rest. 
F(3,550)= 0.078 with Significance Level 0.972.Null of homogeneity of slope of HI versus heterogeneous slopes across regions. 
The dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita PPP-adjusted output. See table (A1) for the notation of the 
regressors.  *, ** and *** imply the significance of the coefficient at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance 
respectively. The coefficients reported are estimated in a model with the deterministic components indicated by the 
ANOVA analysis. Heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics are given in parenthesis. The analysis of variance tests for 
                                                                                                                                               
category. Again, we could not reject the null of homogeneous time effects for the EU as a whole. As a last 
check, we also allowed for a different slope on CCI for each regional group, not being able to reject the 
null of a homogeneous slope on CCI as in model 14. 
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regression without fixed and time effects. *, ** and *** imply the rejection of common means across individuals, 
across time, or both at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively. The variables REG1HI, REG2HI, 
REG3HI and REG4HI relate to the regional groups defined in the text. 
 
 
the high correlation between them
32. This may indicate that we do not have enough 
variability in the data for a too detailed decomposition of institutional factors 
surrounding the process of the opening of the financial industry in the EU. Therefore, 
considering that harmonisation and the deregulation of domestic financial systems have 
been rather simultaneous and may have reinforced each other, we estimate the growth 
effect of these institutional changes by computing an overall index (DREG) as the sum 
of HI, CCI and IRI
33. Model 16 provides strong evidence of a positive overall growth 
effect from the institutional changes considered here. 
Thus far, we have found consistent evidence that both the lifting of capital 
controls and the harmonisation of banking legislation positively affect growth. 
However, skeptics could still argue that our policy indexes may be capturing the effect 
of some other omitted policy factors from the regression. One particular set of policies 
that have been actively implemented in the EU over the last twenty years are fiscal 
policies aimed at improving the infrastructure endowment and the softening of taxation 
levels in order to create more employment and investment and in turn more output 
growth
34. Therefore, we control in our regressions for the investment rate in public 
capital as well as for the ratio of total direct taxation to GDP (which comprises personal 
and corporate capital income taxation). Models 17 and 19 show that the coefficients on 
HI and CCI are of similar size to earlier models and statistically significant. As far as 
the growth impact of fiscal policies is concerned, direct taxation appears to adversely 
affect growth while public investment enters insignificant. 
This preliminary evidence lends support to the existence of a positive growth 
impact from the policy changes implied by the harmonisation of banking legislation at 
the EU level and the liberalisation of capital controls, even after controlling for other 
pro-growth policies implemented around the same time. We could not find though, a 
significant impact from interest rate deregulation. This may indicate that ceilings on 
deposit rates and caps on lending rates did not have an apparent direct impact on 
                                                 
32 Both series correlate with a correlation coefficient of 0.77. 
33 As noted by Wyplosz (1999), restrictions on quantities and prices of domestic banking sectors in 
Europe have been normally accompanied by the imposition of capital controls, since the former would 
otherwise be easily evaded if there existed the possibility of lending or borrowing from abroad. For 
similar reasons, once domestic controls begin to be lifted, the need to maintain restrictions on capital 
movements decreases. 
34 See Romero de Ávila and Strauch (2003). 
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through transferring funds on a cross-border dimension due to the existence of exchange 
controls, financial intermediaries made the effort to compensate for the decrease in 
banking activity that such measures brought about by expanding the branch network 
with the aim of attracting clients
35. 
TABLE 3: GROWTH REGRESSIONS AND DEREGULATION OF INTEREST RATES AND 
CAPITAL CONTROLS 
                                BASIC GROWTH MODEL                                                                 MODEL  AUGMENTED 
                                                                                                                                          WITH FISCAL POLICIES 
MODEL    (11) (12) (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
HI      0.173**    0.132   0.170**     
    (2.001)    (1.501)   (2.118)     
DERI  0.209               
  (1.203)               
IRI   0.011  -0.121        -0.1677    
   (0.037)  (-0.380)        (-0.543)    
CCI     0.578*  0.473     0.524*   
     (1.911)  (1.491)     (1.685)   
DREG         0.144**     0.135** 
         (2.138)     (2.09) 
CRISFIN  -5.451***-5.382*** -4.941***-5.527***  -5.172***  -5.070***-5.083*** -5.497*** -5.665***-5.220***
  (-3.029) (-3.025) (-2.734) (-3.069)  (-2.814)  (-2.799) (-2.894) (-3.221) (-3.246) (-2.97) 
CRISFRA  -1.153***-1.125V -0.960***-1.170*** -1.042*** -1.013***-0.839***  -0.992***  -1.080***-0.904***
  (-3.591)    (-3.521) (-2.973) (-3.626)  -3.208)  (-3.164) (-2.618) (-3.122) (-3.363) (-2.859) 
CRISGER  0.415 0.479 0.356 0.257  0.212  0.3416  0.521 0.6173  0.431 0.5027 
  (0.784) (0.915) (0.724) (0.493)  (0.421)  (0.678) (0.971) (1.101) (0.762) (0.918) 
CRISESP  -2.070***-2.093*** -1.844***-2.051***  -1.865***  -1.866***-1.510*** -1.803*** -1.726***-1.542***
  (-4.149) (-4.229) (-3.485) (-4.094)  (-3.498)  (-3.576) (-2.808) (-3.499) (-3.317) (-2.879) 
CRISSWE  -2.598***-2.690*** -2.457***-2.309***  -2.223***  -2.456***-2.864*** -3.031*** -2.703***-2.831***
  (-4.687) (-4.886) (-4.047) (-3.879)  (-3.609)  (-4.173) (-4.700) (-5.246) (-4.327) (-4.65) 
CRISUK  -0.248 -0.361 -0.405 -0.187  -0.228  -0.293 0.079  0.0827 0.211  0.1326 
  (-0.250) (-0.364) (-0.414) (-0.189)  (-0.231)  (-0.298) (0.079)  (0.082)  (0.210)  (0.133) 
LTDIR          -1.695***  -1.737***  -1.830***-1.712***
          (-3.150)  (-3.242)  (-3.395)  (-3.197) 
LPI          -0.034  -0.088  0.090  0.0178 
            (-0.086)  (-0.220)  (0.220)  (0.045) 
ANOVA               
INDIV  7.186*** 6.446***  4.561*** 7.680*** 5.620*** 4.876*** 3.123***  3.607  3.443*** 3.161***
TIME 14.553***13.667*** 16.320***14.190*** 16.399*** 16.400***6.626*** 6.734  6.759*** 6.641***
JOINT 12.643***11.795*** 13.271***12.502*** 13.605*** 13.413***5.850*** 6.051  6.026*** 5.869***
R
2  0.750 0.750 0.751 0.751  0.752  0.7513  0.748 0.746 0.747 0.747 
Usable  
Observ.  615 615 615 615  615  615 544 544 544 544 
F(120,433)= 0.99 with Significance Level 0.49. Null of homogeneity of time dummies versus regional time effects. 
F(80,473)=  1.108 with Significance Level 0.258. Null of homogeneity of time dummies versus different regional time  
effects in the early deregulators group and southern countries differentiated from the rest. 
F(3,550)= 0.121  with Significance Level 0.95.Null of homogeneity of slope of CCI versus heterogeneous slopes across regions 
See Table (2). 
                                                 
35 As noted by Wyplosz (1999), quantitative restrictions such as credit ceilings did not bind either, since 
the wide range of exemptions to such measures allowed financial intermediaries to get around them. In 
addition, the presence of interest rate restrictions in the presence of information asymmetries and moral 
hazard in the banking industry can lead to the increase in the franchise value of banks, thereby 
encouraging prudent behaviour when lending funds (See Hellmann et al., 2000). 
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6 Further Robustness Checks 
  In the previous section we have dealt with the issue of business cycles by 
including time effects that control for any common shocks affecting all countries in a 
given period such as the 1973 oil shock. We also tried to control for the possibility of 
regional business cycles, but we statistically rejected the inclusion of regional time 
effects. Still it could be argued that individual countries liberalised capital controls and 
approximated banking legislation in anticipation to future investment opportunities and 
in turn better growth prospects. This possibility would derive from the existence of 
country-specific shocks that would trigger the process of banking deregulation in the 
expectation of an upturn in the national business cycle.  
We deal with this possibility by detrending the output series using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter. In Hiebert et al. (2002) we noted that this method may be preferable to 
five-year averaging the output series as commonly done in the literature in order to 
remove any cyclical fluctuations from the data. The value of the detrending parameter λ 
used to detrend the output series are set to 30 and 100
36. We use data on PPP-adjusted 
output until 2003 (where 2002 and 2003 values are predictions) in order to generate our 
series of potential output. Then we remove the data from 2001 onwards, since the 
procedure tends to bias the final observations. This approach is also preferable to the 
way Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) deal with the issue of national business cycles. They 
essentially introduced lagged values of the dependent variable as regressors. However, 
the correlation between lagged output growth and the country-specific effects leads to 
inconsistent estimates as demonstrated by Nickell (1981) and Kiviet (1995)
37. Table (4) 
presents the estimation results using as a dependent variable the growth rate of potential 
output computed with λ=30
38. It is reassuring that, if anything, the link between CCI 
and growth is strengthened even after controlling for fiscal policy changes while IRI 
appears marginally significant when we do not control for fiscal policies. It is also 
interesting that once we filter the output series, the crisis indicators fall by about half of 
the size of the estimates shown in tables (2) and (3). This is a clear indication that the 
long-run growth effect of major banking insolvencies is not as high as found in growth 
                                                 
36 We consider the case of λ=30 following Bouthevillain et al. (2001) who examined cyclical adjustment 
methodology applied to public finances in the EU, finding that business cycles normally last for eight to 
ten years. 
37 Judson and Owen (2001) found that even in the case of a time dimension as large as 30, the bias was as 
large as 20% of the true value of the coefficient. 
38 The results that follow when we use trend growth computed with λ=100 are similar in nature since both 
filtered series of output growth correlate with each other with a correlation coefficient of 0.99 and are 
available from the author upon request. 
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Swedish crises amounts to around 2% and 1% respectively, while approximately to 1% 
and 0.5% in Spain and France. 
  
TABLE 4: SHORT-RUN SENSITIVITY WITH HP GROWTH WITH LAMBDA =30 
   BASIC MODEL     MODEL WITH FISCAL POLICIES 
HI   0.137**    0.140***     0.103*   
  (2.399)    (2.722)     (1.929)   
CCI    0.840***    0.637***   0.560***   
    (5.544)    (3.986)   (3.257)   
IRI     0.3239*    0.2325    
     (1.791)    (1.400)    
DREG          0.144*** 
          (3.758) 
CRISFIN  -1.711***  -2.267*** -2.078*** -1.606*** -2.147*** -1.972*** -1.866*** -1.648*** 
  (-4.281)  (-6.518) (-6.073) (-4.441) (-6.931) (-6.609) (-4.886) (-4.731) 
CRISFRA  -0.492*  -0.686***  -0.637*** -0.458** -0.689*** -0.618*** -0.576** -0.488** 
  (-1.953)  (-2.707) (-2.607) (-2.116) (-3.200) (-2.988) (-2.550) (-2.306) 
CRISGER  0.501***  0.282*  0.6196*** 0.657*** 0.514**  0.767*** 0.475**  0.613*** 
  (2.912)  (1.686) (2.992) (3.346) (2.579) (3.276) (2.580) (3.195) 
CRISESP  -1.326***  -1.459*** -1.506*** -1.136*** -1.278*** -1.347*** -1.122*** -1.101*** 
  (-4.925)  (-5.849) (-6.144) (-3.644) (-4.267) (-4.484) (-3.617) (-3.559) 
CRISSWE  -0.920*** -0.543* -1.161*** -1.224*** -0.965*** -1.425*** -0.891***  -1.140*** 
  (-2.790)  (-1.859) (-4.094) (-3.982) (-3.292) (-5.252) (-2.915) (-3.723) 
CRISUK  0.259  0.522**  0.3435  0.824*** 0.971*** 0.884*** 0.938*** 0.873*** 
  (1.177)  (2.357) (1.498) (3.202) (3.809) (3.373) (3.693) (3.426) 
LTDIR      -0.500*  -0.645**  -0.480*  -0.620**  -0.509* 
        (-1.813) (-2.335) (-1.749) (-2.210) (-1.859) 
LPI      -0.671*** -0.510**  -0.679*** -0.503**  -0.602*** 
         (-2.911) (-2.129) (-2.927) (-2.100) (-2.627) 
ANOVA           
INDIV  13.980***  22.641***  18.558** 8.313*** 8.632*** 9.274*** 8.386*** 8.345*** 
TIME      35.441***  28.277*** 25.988*** 5.415***  5.554***  5.610***  5.501***  5.427*** 
JOINT        29.772***  26.788***  24.026*** 6.544*** 6.717*** 6.936*** 6.615*** 6.559*** 
R
2  0.896 0.899 0.895 0.897 0.898 0.895 0.898 0.897
Usable 
Observ.  600 600 600 529 529 529 529 529
The dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita PPP-adjusted output filtered with Hodrick-Prescott 
filter with a detrending parameter equal to 30. See Table (2) for the rest. 
 
As an additional robustness check we tested for the existence of structural 
changes across time in the coefficients on HI and CCI included one at a time as in 
models 2 and 14 shown above. Table (5) presents the results of the structural change 
tests for five different experiments, not rendering evidence of a statistically different 
growth impact of our policy changes across periods. This indicates that the growth 
impact of capital controls liberalisation and the harmonisation of banking laws is not 
driven by a specific period where there was a combination of fast output growth and a 
ECB • Working Paper No 266 • September 2003 31fast rate of adoption of financial liberalisation measures. Rather, the growth impact of 
these policies seems to be of a long-term nature
39. 
 
TABLE 5: SUMMARY STRUCTURAL BREAK TESTS        
EXPERIMENT  1  2  3 4 5 
F-TEST FOR THE CHANGE IN SLOPE IN HI   0.647  0.533  0.009  1.014  1.527 
Prob. of rejection.  (0.63)  (0.59)  (0.92)  (0.31)  (0.22) 
F-TEST FOR THE CHANGE IN SLOPE IN CCI  1.226  0.950  0.689  0.950  0.048 
Prob. of rejection.  (0.33)  (0.30)  (0.41)  (0.33)  (0.83) 
                 
Test for the null hypothesis of a homogeneous slope over the whole period versus heterogeneous slopes across periods. 
1 We allow for a different slope for each of the five periods: 1960-1980, 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995 and 1996-2001. 
2 We split the sample in three periods: 1960-1985, 1986-1995 and 1996-2001.   
3 We split the sample in two periods: 1960-1980 and 1981-2001.     
4 We split the sample in two periods: 1960-1985 and 1986-2001.     
5 We split the sample in two periods: 1960-1990 and 1991-2001.     
*, ** and *** imply the rejection of a common slope on the coefficient of interest at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels of significance respectively . 
 
7 Transmission Channels from Financial Policies to Changes in Output Growth 
  Once we have determined the existence of a robust positive link between the 
policy changes under consideration and output growth, it may be interesting to analyse 
the exact channels through which HI and CCI may have affected growth. As argued in 
the introduction, two main mechanisms through which financial policies may affect 
growth have been emphasised in the literature, i.e. the increase in the level of banking 
activity and the improvement in the efficiency of financial intermediation. 
In table (6) we show the estimates of some regressions with the dependent 
variable trying to proxy for the transmission channels through which our policy changes 
may affect growth. In models 21 to 23, we use as dependent variable the credit granted 
by deposit money banks to the private sector as a share of GDP expressed in natural 
logs. This variable should proxy for the level of financial intermediation. The 
coefficient on HI in model 21 implies that the adoption of Council Directives equivalent 
to 10 points of HI has caused the credit to GDP ratio to increase by 1%. As far as the 
effect of CCI on banking activity is concerned, considering that the average of the ratio 
of private credit to GDP equals 55.293 for the EU over the whole period, model 22 
indicates that such figure would be equal to 50.33 if no liberalisation of capital controls 
                                                 
39 Some informal evidence supporting these claims is that during the period 1990-1995 when the biggest 
push towards the deregulation and harmonisation of the banking industry has taken place, if anything, 
output growth has been steady or even decreased in most of the countries with respect to other periods.  
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40. Furthermore, model 23 renders a significantly positive effect of 
interest rate deregulation on the extent of financial intermediation. This preliminary 
evidence lends support to the increase in banking activity as a result of the lifting of 
interest rates and capital controls and harmonisation of banking legislation in the EU. 
A second channel we would like to investigate is the improvement in the quality 
and efficiency in financial intermediation. As mentioned by Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1996), to accurately measure the efficiency in the allocation of financial resources to 
productive use, one would need specific information on the productivity of individual 
investment projects financed by financial intermediaries. That would indicate how 
efficiently the monitoring and screening of individual projects have been carried out. 
However, such data are not available on a EU-wide basis. Instead, we use the growth 
rate of the ratio of total provisions on loans to total loans obtained from the balance 
sheet information provided by credit institutions, which may capture the change in the 
quality of bank portfolios as a result of the institutional changes considered here
41. We 
obtain this data from the Bank Profitability Statistics (2000 edition) published by the 
OECD. The time span covered is quite short and data are not available for Luxembourg. 
Overall, only 150 usable observations can be counted. Model 24 gives some indications 
that the process of harmonisation of banking legislation may have reduced the 
percentage of nonperforming loans. The impact appears important, implying that the 
adoption of Banking Directives equivalent to 10 points has led to a decrease in the 
growth rate of the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans by almost 0.6% per year. 
We now run some growth regressions that control for the changes in the quantity 
and quality of financial intermediation in order to determine whether HI and CCI still 
retain their significance as well as to give some indications of the relative importance of 
each transmission mechanism to growth. Since in these regressions we introduce as an 
additional control the ratio of private credit to GDP that is likely to be correlated with 
growth over the cycle, we make use of the filtered output growth series that should 




                                                 
40 This is computed according to Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) who provide a formula to interpret the 
coefficients on dummy variables in semi-logarithmic equations. If we substract the coefficient on CCI 
from the logarithm of 55.293, this renders a value of 3.91 which is the natural log of 50.33. 
41 Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) have warned that changes in the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans can be caused by factors different from deregulation such as changes in bank loan portfolios 
associated with a lower risk-taking on the part of banks. 
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LIBERALISATION AND HARMONISATION OF BANKING LEGISLATION 
MODEL  (21) (22) (23)  (24)  (25) (26) 
DEP. 
VAR. LCREDY  LCREDY LCREDY DLPROV DLPROV DLPROV 
         
HI   0.102***     -0.590*     
  (5.790)     (-1.777)     
CCI   0.094**     -5.199   
   (2.010)     (-1.350)   
IRI    0.128***     0.1719 
    (2.639)     (1.327) 
CRISFIN  0.652*** 0.373*** 0.385***       
  (5.967) (5.350) (5.790)       
CRISFRA  0.373*** 0.274*** 0.273***  -0.042  -0.060  0.079 
  (4.605) (3.210) (3.187)  (-1.020)  (-1.515)  (0.554) 
CRISGER -0.080* -0.050  -0.003  0.365  0.399  0.325 
  (-1.852) (-1.128) (-0.063)  (1.296) (1.413) (0.787) 
CRISESP  0.218*** 0.077  0.074  0.008  0.003  -0.015 
  (4.001) (1.609) (1.601)  (0.055) (0.024)  (-0.094) 
CRISSWE 0.184** 0.117  0.027       
  (1.989) (1.156) (0.286)       
CRISUK  -0.263** -0.226** -0.222**       
   (-2.214)  (-2.012)  (-1.980)       
ANOVA          
INDIV 21.363*** 17.089*** 10.826*** 0.284  0.283  0.280 
TIME      113.171***21.308*** 25.224*** 1.446  1.507*  1.516* 
JOINT     91.047*** 20.396*** 21.761*** 0.987  1.028  1.042 
R
2  0.996 0.995 0.995  0.027 0.018  0.240 
Usable  
Observ.  619 619 619  150 150  150 
The dependent variables are the log-levels of the ratio of private credit to GDP (LCREDY) and the 
growth rate of the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (DLPROV). See Table (2) for the rest. 
 
In table (7) we present the estimation results using trend growth computed with 
λ=30
42. In model 27 we control for the logarithm of private credit to GDP, which is 
found to significantly correlate with growth with a coefficient of 0.312. A 1% increase 
in the ratio of private credit to GDP would bring about an increase in per capita output 
growth by 0.31%. Model 28 further controls for HI rendering the coefficient on private 
credit insignificant, giving some indication that the harmonisation of banking legislation 
in the EU has affected output growth in part through the increase in banking activity. 
The fact that HI is significant, further indicates that it has affected growth beyond its 
effect on the expansion and deepening of banking activity, probably through the 
efficiency channel. The coefficient on HI of around 0.1 implies that the adoption of 
Directives equivalent to 10 points (50% of the maximum value of HI) has brought about 
                                                 
42 The results that follow when using trend growth computed with λ=100 are similar and available from 
the author upon request. 
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mean of output growth in the EU over the period under scrutiny. 
Model 29 shows that CCI also affects growth beyond its effect on the level of 
financial intermediation. The coefficient on private credit retains its significance at 
10%, but reduces in magnitude by 18% with respect to model 27. This may indicate that 
the efficiency channel is more important in explaining the influence of capital controls 
liberalisation on growth than the increase in the investment volume. 
Model 31 shows that our efficiency proxy is significantly correlated with growth 
at 10%. The coefficient equals -0.18, entailing that a 1% decrease in the growth rate of 
non-performing to total loans may bring about an increase in output growth by 0.18%. 
Model 33, which further controls for CCI, renders the coefficient on the efficiency 
proxy insignificant, while CCI remains significant. While these latter findings may not 
be conclusive given the limited number of observations, they corroborate the findings 
from model 29 that the main channel through which capital controls liberalisation may 
enhance growth has been by improving the quality of bank portfolios and in turn the 
efficiency in the allocation of financial resources to productive use. The reason that our 
efficiency proxy is driven insignificant when we control for CCI, could simply be that 
such policy change may be better proxying for the change in banking efficiency than the 
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, which could be decreasing after the lifting 
of capital controls due to factors completely unrelated to the policy change. 
As regards the process of harmonisation of banking legislation, the fact that HI 
positively correlates with the ratio of private credit to GDP (model 21), which in turn is 
positively related to output growth (model 27) and is driven insignificant once we 
control for HI (model 28), indicates that one channel through which HI has influenced 
growth is the increase in banking activity and in turn in the level of investment. 
Furthermore HI affects output growth beyond its effect on the level of financial 
intermediation, rendering some tentative evidence that the channel associated with 
improvements in the quality of financial intermediation may be also important in 
explaining the link between harmonisation and growth. This is further corroborated by 
model 32 that controls for the efficiency proxy, which becomes insignificant once we 
introduce HI in the regression, since as argued for the case of CCI, HI may be indeed 
better proxying for the change in the competitive conditions and in efficiency following 




TABLE 7: TRANSMISSION CHANNELS FROM FINANCIAL POLICIES  
TO GROWTH MODELS WITH HP GROWTH WITH PARAMETER EQUAL TO 30 
MODEL  (27) (28) (29)  (30)  (31) (32) (33) (34) 
HI    0.109*      0.093***    
   (1.812)      (2.444)    
CCI    0.802***      0.339*   
    (5.269)      (1.751)   
IRI     0.276     0.060 
     (1.559)     (0.403) 
LCREDY  0.312** 0.224  0.255*  0.288**         
  (2.238) (1.528) (1.890) (2.151)         
DLPROV       -0.180*  -0.087  -0.101  -0.102 
       (-1.840)  (-1.052)  (-1.224)  (-1.236) 
CRISFIN  -2.185*** -1.878*** -2.367*** -2.197***       
  (-6.543) (-4.517) (-6.652) (-6.294)         
CRISFRA -0.711*** -0.587**  -0.762*** -0.721***-0.329*** -0.276**  -0.291*** -0.323***
  (-2.931) (-2.319) (-3.033) (-2.969)  (-3.498) (-2.189) (-2.372) (-2.603) 
CRISGER 0.586*** 0.512*** 0.290*  0.609*** 0.068  0.215  0.047  0.190 
  (3.137) (2.933) (1.726) (3.027)  (0.225) (0.507) (0.112) (0.480) 
CRISESP  -1.552*** -1.393*** -1.492*** -1.540***-1.311*** -1.564*** -1.684*** -1.767***
  (-6.211) (-5.035) (-5.835) (-6.109)  (-5.201) (-5.621) (-6.048) (-6.257) 
CRISSWE -1.123*** -0.981*** -0.597**  -1.182***       
  (-3.915) (-2.966) (-2.045) (-4.152)         
CRISUK  0.328 0.305 0.564***  0.393*         
   (1.423) (1.371) (2.557) (1.709)         
ANOVA           
INDIV  14.250*** 14.225*** 11.057*** 10.489***11.99*** 16.893*** 17.735***  10.057***
TIME      14.208*** 11.842*** 10.042*** 10.028***1.216 10.587*** 3.179***  3.591*** 
JOINT     14.252*** 12.542*** 10.361*** 10.206***6.211*** 15.165*** 10.096***  5.965*** 
R
2  0.895 0.895 0.898 0.894  0.951 0.970 0.970 0.968 
Usable  
Observ.  593 593 593 593  150 150 150 150 
The dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita PPP-adjusted output filtered with the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with a detrending parameter equal to 30. See Table (2) for the rest. 
 
 
Regarding the growth impact of the deregulation of interest rates, model 30 
shows that IRI enters insignificant once we control for the ratio of private credit to 
GDP. Thus interest rates deregulation only affects growth by increasing banking 
activity. This contrasts with HI and CCI that affect growth partly through the efficiency 
channel. Since harmonisation and the lifting of capital controls are policies 
implemented with the aim of increasing cross-border activity, bringing about greater 
competition and hence efficiency improvements, we will directly test this implication 
by regressing our policy changes on foreign penetration measures after controlling for 
                                                 
43 Gual (1999) constructed an index with the implementation dates of some Banking Directives in order to 
proxy for the degree of competition in the EU financial services industry after deregulation. 
ECB • Working Paper No 266 • September 2003 36banking crisis episodes. The foreign bank share is computed as the ratio of foreign bank 
assets to total banking sector assets and is obtained from Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 
(2001) that used Bankscope as the primary source. The results point to a highly 
significant positive impact from harmonisation and capital control lifting on foreign 
bank penetration, whereas interest rate deregulation entered insignificant. This further 
corroborates our earlier findings that only harmonisation and the liberalisation of capital 
movements raise the efficiency of financial intermediation
44. 
 
7.1 Discussion of Results  
These findings accord quite well with the facts and with some existing evidence. 
Since capital controls usually prevent domestic financial institutions to operate in 
foreign markets, these institutions tend to have a less diversified portfolio. This entails a 
lower degree of efficiency in the allocation of resources since credit institutions are 
more prone to be adversely affected by domestic shocks, making them more vulnerable 
to episodes of financial distress
45. 
With regard to the process of harmonisation of banking legislation across the EU 
which is found to increase the level and efficiency of the financial services industry, 
there is also some indirect evidence that partly back up our findings. Jayaratne and 
Strahan (1996) document that the relaxation of branching restrictions in the United 
States has caused an increase in growth through improvements in bank lending quality, 
which may derive from greater competition brought about by the entry of new banks 
and cross-state consolidation that helps removing less efficient banks. They note that the 
increase in bank size may also lead to a more diversified portfolio as found in Demsetz 
and Strahan (1995) and the opening of the banking industry may create a disciplining 
mechanism for managers not to deviate from the value maximisation of the institution 
as a result of increased takeover threat. 
In the European context, we note that the existence of interest rate regulations 
and capital controls along with entry and branching restrictions affected the financial 
services industry by reducing competition and in turn its degree of efficiency. By lifting 
restrictions on interest rates, capital movements and foreign bank entry, European 
markets have experienced intensified competition coming from abroad. As documented 
                                                 
44 I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this exercise. The results are available from the author 
upon request. 
45 See Caprio and Klingebiel (1996b) for an extensive discussion on the role played by microeconomic 
factors such as prudential regulatory measures of the banking industry and macroeconomic factors in 
shaping the degree of efficiency of the banking industry. 
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and credit markets has led to important reductions in deposit and loan rates across the 
EU and particularly in Greece, Italy and Spain. The wholesale markets have been 
associated with greater falls in prices than the retail sector. This has been translated into 
a decrease in the cost of borrowing at the corporate level, which has given incentive for 
more investment and growth. 
A study by the ECB (1999) has documented that the number of banks in the EU 
has considerably decreased by around 26% from 1990 to 1997, which may give a 
further indication that the process of financial integration in the EU has served as a 
mechanism to remove inefficient banks. Indeed, the adoption of the Second Banking 
Directive gave rise to a wave of mergers and acquisitions across Europe, since financial 
institutions envisaged the need to operate on a bigger scale within an integrated 
European market in order to reap scale economies benefits at the EU level. As noted by 
Cabral et al. (2002), the process of financial integration has made banks more efficient 
since they can enjoy scale economies at the industry level by operating in a bigger 
wholesale market for corporate services in the EU. 
As regards the disciplining mechanism implied by increased takeover or merger 
threat following a deeper and more integrated market, no clear evidence has emerged. 
Indeed, one may expect this mechanism not to be fully operating since the Takeover 
Directive has not been yet implemented, and each Member State can pose barriers to 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions resorting to the “general good clause” with the 
aim of sheltering domestic institutions from foreign competition. 
All in all, the process of banking deregulation has brought about intensified 
competition that has been accompanied with the harmonisation of prudential and 
supervisory rules aimed at limiting the risk-taking of credit institutions and ensuring the 
soundness and stability of the financial services industry. This has brought about an 
improvement in bank lending quality, leading in turn to greater efficiency in the 
allocation of resources to productive use and to greater growth. 
  
8 Conclusions 
In this study we have analysed the link between finance and growth by studying 
the effect that the process of financial deregulation and harmonisation of banking laws 
at the EU level may have exerted on growth over the last 40 years. We argue that the 
experience of the EU may constitute an ideal scenario to shed some light on the 
unresolved issue of causality in the finance-growth nexus, since Member States have 
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harmonisation of banking regulations imposed by the EU Authorities with the aim of 
increasing the volume and efficiency of the financial services industry. 
Throughout the analysis, we find that the process of capital control lifting and 
the harmonisation of banking laws at the EU level have brought about important 
benefits in terms of increases in the growth rate of the economy. The growth impact 
from the liberalisation of capital controls is found to be at least of 0.6% per year which 
is equivalent to 21% of the unconditional averaged growth rate of per capita output 
experienced in the EU over 1960-2001. The estimates of the growth effect from the 
harmonisation of banking regulations entail that the implementation of Directives 
equivalent to 10 points has brought about an increase in output growth by at least 1% 
per year. Therefore, the maximum increase in output growth from the harmonisation of 
banking regulations can reach about 2%. These results appear robust to the inclusion of 
other pro-growth policy changes implemented around the same time and are not driven 
by business cycle effects. We also tested for the existence of structural changes in the 
coefficients of interest in case there was a specific period experiencing fast growth and 
fast adoption of deregulatory measures that could drive the results. We could not find 
evidence of structural change, which suggests that the growth impact estimated is not of 
a short-run nature.  
We further investigated the mechanisms through which these policy changes 
may have influenced the growth performance of EU economies. We considered two 
main channels: 1) the increase in the level of financial intermediation measured by the 
rise in the ratio of private credit to GDP and 2) the improvement in the quality and 
efficiency of the financial intermediation process proxied by the fall in the growth rate 
of the ratio of non-performing to total loans. On this regard, we found that while the 
harmonisation process has impacted growth through the increase in the level and 
efficiency of financial intermediation, the liberalisation of capital controls has primarily 
affected growth through improvements in the degree of efficiency in financial 
intermediation. Furthermore, interest rate deregulation was found to affect the level of 
banking activity while not its efficiency. 
Overall, the positive benefits in terms of economic performance resulting from 
the liberalisation of capital controls and the harmonisation of banking regulations 
accord well with the expectations by the EU Authorities and Member States. The 
creation of a Single European Banking Market has opened domestic banking sectors, 
created more cross-border activity and in turn more competition, which have been all 
ECB • Working Paper No 266 • September 2003 39translated into greater banking activity and enhanced efficiency in the allocation of 
resources to productive use by decreasing the cost of capital. All these benefits have 
derived from the efforts made by the European and National Authorities who envisaged 
the need to couple the liberalisation of interest rates, capital controls and entry 
restrictions with the strengthening of prudential, supervisory and accounting standards. 
This has ensured that excessive competition does not destabilise the financial services 
industry. 
Nonetheless, the EU Authorities have been cautiously optimistic over the last 
years and have put forward more initiatives through the Financial Services Action Plan 
of 1999 with the aim of stepping up in the process of financial integration in Europe. As 
already acknowledged, some further work needs to be done since the Takeover 
Directive has not been adopted yet. This may undermine the process of cross-border 
consolidation, which may be necessary for credit institutions to enjoy economies of 
scale at the EU level. 
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TABLE A2 : CORRELATION MATRIX         







HI   1.000               
I1   0.878  1.000              
I2   0.971  0.843  1.000             
I3   0.958  0.804  0.948  1.000            
I4   0.877  0.676  0.846  0.830  1.000         
I5   0.964  0.782  0.917  0.921  0.835 1.000        
I6   0.444 0.282 0.352 0.359 0.409 0.406 1.000           
CCI  0.772 0.797 0.762 0.725 0.643 0.699 0.239 1.000      
IRI  0.811 0.800 0.811 0.770 0.670 0.749 0.251 0.833 1.000     
DERI  0.824 0.821 0.830 0.784 0.689 0.743 0.259 0.938 0.934 1.000    
GROWTH  -0.071 -0.178 -0.083 -0.044  0.013 -0.042 0.050 -0.138 -0.169 -0.152 1.000    
HPGR30  -0.181 -0.309 -0.179 -0.116 -0.070 -0.152 -0.002 -0.209 -0.262 -0.235 0.673 1.000   
CREDY  0.493 0.487 0.444 0.472 0.389 0.448 0.327 0.474 0.481 0.475 -0.124 -0.197  1.000 
DLPROV  -0.179 -0.163 -0.191 -0.148 -0.128 -0.174 -0.076 -0.098 -0.049 -0.081 -0.302 -0.136  0.010 1.000
See Table (A1) for the notation. 
 
TABLE A3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
    
Series Observations  Mean  Std.  Error Minimum Maximum 
HI  630 4.208  5.874  0.000  19.900 
I1   630 1.117  1.204  0.000  3.000 
I2   630 0.889  1.312  0.000  4.000 
I3   630 0.481  0.762  0.000  2.000 
I4   630 0.532  1.000  0.000  4.000 
I5   630 1.082  1.723  0.000  5.000 
I6   630 0.071  0.323  0.000  2.000 
CCI  630 0.357  0.479  0.000  1.000 
IRI  630 0.337  0.473  0.000  1.000 
DERI  630 0.657  0.880  0.000  2.000 
GROWTH  615 2.862  2.631  -9.164  11.553 
HPGR30  600 2.860  1.599  -0.732  10.292 
CREDY  619 55.293  27.504  8.255  145.470 
DLCREDY 604 2.821  7.403  -38.049  47.987 
DLPROV  150 -0.016  0.439  -1.930  1.413 
See Table (A1) for the notation. The PPP-adjusted output series for 
Germany obtained from the Economic Outlook (OECD) shows a clear 
structural break in 1991. In order to correct for the structural break we use 
growth rates of output from the Penn World Tables to backward compute 
the approximate levels of output for the whole Germany for the period 
before the reunification. 
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